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Abstract 
The winner’s curse is a well-known phenomenon in the auction theory. The main 
aim of this article is to verify its existence in football broadcasting rights. The 
underlying objective is to assess whether some indices of this situation are verified 
and can cause a winner’s curse. The methodology is based on the application of 
Andreff (2014)’s six indices and a seventh index (disappointment) to the domestic 
markets for broadcasting rights of the French and English football leagues. These 
two markets have seen an increase in the number of packages offered to 
broadcasters, with the possibility of several ‘winners’. The paper shows that the 
winner of the major packages in the auction is not cursed. The curse is more likely 
to happen for the second mover. As such, the paper suggests a practical 
recommendation for broadcasters interested in football rights: win the best package 
or keep away.   
Keywords 
winner’s curse, football broadcasting rights, first mover advantage, second mover 
disadvantage, bidding process, broadcast packages 
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1. Introduction 
The winner’s curse is a well-known phenomenon in economics. It is one of the negative 
externalities listed in the auction theory, along with collusions or information 
asymmetries for example. Andreff (2012, p.120) describes that this curse explains “the 
underlying causes of the winner’s disappointment in the bid, due to costs higher than 
initially planned.” Thaler (1988, p.192) lists two ways where the winner is cursed: “(1) 
the winning bid exceeds the value of the tract, so the firm loses money; or (2) the value 
of the tract is less than the expert's estimate so the winning firm is disappointed”. 
Klemperer (2002, p.173) underlines the winner’s curse as the situation “when bidders 
have the same, or close to the same, actual value for a prize, but they have different 
information about that actual value”. According to the author, the threat is for “the 
party who has most greatly overestimated the value of the prize”. A famous example of 
this asymmetry situation comes from the article of Akerlof (1970) about the second-
hand automobile market or "market for lemons". Also related to automobile, Bliss and 
Nalebuff (1984) take the example of the "game of chicken". This game consists of two 
cars racing towards each other, the loser (chicken) being the first driver to veer off the 
collision course. As mentioned by the authors, “The longer each driver waits, the 
smaller is the value from turning as collision is more likely to be inevitable” (Bliss & 
Nalebuff, 1984, p.3). As such, this situation is likely to generate two ‘winners’ who will 
be cursed. This idea that two (or more) winners may be cursed is relevant to situations 
  
 
 
3 
 
 
where several prizes are allocated, as this can be the case on the market for sports 
broadcasting rights which is the focus of interest in this paper. 
Andreff (2014, p.24) considers the winner’s curse as a “major concept in sports 
economics”. The most frequent cases are the right to host Olympics, the acquisition of 
superstars but also the purchase of a franchise in North American professional sports or 
public subsidies in stadia construction (Rosentraub & Swindell, 2002). For example, the 
Olympics in Montreal, Athens, Sochi or Rio de Janeiro widely exceeded the anticipated 
costs ex post. The winner’s curse is also found in the race for free agents, for example in 
baseball (Cassing & Douglas, 1980). The recent case of Mike Conley Jr illustrates this 
situation in basketball: this 28-year-old player has never been part of All Star selections 
(best players of the league) and has signed during the summer 2016 the biggest contract 
in the history of the NBA with the Memphis Grizzlies for $153m over five years. Such a 
contract is possible because of the competition between teams. In this case, Dallas 
Mavericks (the only other team Mike Conley Jr met among several other teams 
interested) was willing to offer the player a big contract so Memphis did their best to 
outbid their competitor’s offer. 
In this paper, we focus on another situation related to the winner’s curse in 
sports economics: the bidding for broadcasting rights. In European football, this has 
hugely increased over the past 25 years. More and more TV channels have been 
interested in broadcasting football games, leading to a fierce competition favouring the 
winner’s curse. Our objective is to verify whether this has been the case and, if so, what 
are the exact causes and who have been cursed. A multiple case study (Eisenhardt, 
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1989, 1991; Vigour, 2005, Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007) is used in this paper. It allows 
us to make a comparative analysis between two European football leagues: the English 
Premier League (EPL) and the French Ligue 1 (L1). Their two domestic markets (UK 
and France) are quite similar in terms of population (respectively 65,111,000 and 
64,668,000 inhabitants1, even if the demographic structure is different2) and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (respectively 2420 and 2860 billion US$3). As such, we will 
be able to verify whether the situations are quite similar with regards to the winner's 
curse in these two leagues that have some similarities in terms of domestic market and 
an 'historic' domestic broadcaster each: Sky (since 1992) for the EPL and Canal Plus 
(since 1984) for the L1. The winner's curse in the bidding for broadcasting rights has 
important economic and social implications for fans: pay-TV channels will seek to 
increase subscription fees to avoid the winner's curse (costs higher for fans who may 
become not able to afford them) or will be cursed and possibly become insolvent, 
meaning that fans will lose their access to games without being reimbursed. This is in 
line with the conclusion of Noll (2007, p.419): “As time progresses, centralization of 
the sale of television rights in leagues will cause increasing harm to consumers by 
 
1 Unesco, 2016. UIS Statistics, Total population, http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx 
2 Baudelle Guy. 2002. Deux systèmes urbains ? Une comparaison hiérarchique de la croissance 
urbaine de part et d'autre de la Manche [Two urban systems? A hierarchical comparison of 
the urban growth on both sides of the Channel] (1960-1990). In: L'information 
géographique, volume 66, n°1, pp. 70-80. 
3 Unesco, 2015. UIS Statistics, GDP Current US$, http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx 
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restricting choice and raising prices”. In Europe, the consumer welfare is even more 
likely to be impacted because of the prevalence of one single sport, namely football 
(Jeanrenaud & Késenne, 2006). 
 
The paper reads as follows. First, the theoretical framework is developed, based 
on the characteristics of the bidding system and some explanations of why the winner’s 
curse may happen in this system, along with the specificities of the market for sports 
broadcasting rights and the indices of a winner’s curse identified in the literature for this 
market. Second, the aim is reminded and the methodology is described. Third, results 
are provided before being discussed in the fourth section. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Bidding system and winner’s curse 
Milgrom and Weber (1982) describe the bidding system as a very old practice already 
found in the Babylonian and the Roman civilizations for the slave’s market. This 
method is now used to sell diverse ‘goods’. Indeed, listed by Krishna (2009), we find 
bids on markets such as concessions of mines, tobacco, fish, fresh flowers, scrap, 
golden ingots, bond issues, long-term titles or public goods. The first analysis dealing 
with the winner’s curse comes from Capen et al. (1971) who advance this hypothesis to 
explain the low returns on investments for companies engaged in competitive biddings 
for oil and gas leases.  
  
 
 
6 
 
 
The auction theory highlights four main types of bids, derived from Vickrey 
(1962). Inspired by Klemperer (2002), Table 1 summarizes these four types of bids. 
Table 1 
 
A characteristic of the bids which generates high prices for providers is its 
uncertainty. It lies in the type of information each competitor can find (or not) about the 
bid, but also for certain types of bids in the amount of the offers proposed by their 
competitors. A bid based on the “common value” model reflects this uncertainty. In this 
type of bid, the “value is not known and the bidders thus have to estimate it based on 
the information they have” (Avenel et al., 2011, p.43). Bidders make offers based on 
their estimation and capacities. For example, it is the case in the bidding for treasury 
bonds or for oil (Harbord, Hernando & von Graevenitz, 1999). 
The elements above may generate the winner’s curse. More specifically, two 
approaches are listed by De Bornier (n.d.) to explain such a winner’s curse, consistent 
with Thaler (1988): 
• an objective approach, where the price paid is higher that the real value of the 
good, 
• a subjective approach, which corresponds to the frustration felt by the winner 
who realises that its surplus could have been much higher when comparing the 
actual amount paid with that proposed by the second bidder. 
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Naegelen (1986, p. 31) notices that this “ambiguity of the literature arises 
because in practice it is difficult ex post to distinguish what lies in the regret and what 
characterizes the curse”. Table 2 illustrates these two approaches. 
Table 2 
 
The winner’s curse has been studied in experimental economy. Bazerman and 
Samuelson (1983) applied the famous jar experiment to verify the phenomenon of 
winner’s curse in common bids. The real value of every jar was $8. Most of players 
being risk-adverse, the average value estimate was $5.13. The average value of the 
winning bid was $10.01. The authors, thus, confirmed the existence of the winner’s 
curse. The overestimation of the good would be due to both the uncertainty on its real 
value and the number of competing bidders, consistent with Capen et al. (1971), 
Klemperer (2002) and Avenel et al. (2011). 
 
First mover advantages, later entrants’ disadvantages and war of attrition 
The winner’s curse applies to situations where there is one winner that overbids 
for a single product at a specific time without dynamic perspective (e.g. overbidding in t 
to take advantage of this in t+1). In the market for sports broadcasting rights, some 
characteristics may question the winner’s curse: the existence of packages meaning 
there might be more than one winner; auctions every three to four years introducing a 
dynamic perspective; the uncertainty about the real value even for the seller due to the 
specific nature of professional sports and the complexity of its market (competition 
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between sports and more generally entertainments and leisure, international competition 
between leagues). Three phenomena appear to be relevant to understand and explain 
these characteristics: the first mover advantages, the curse of later entrants and the war 
of attrition. 
The first mover advantages correspond to a well-known concept in the economic 
literature (von Stackelberg, 1934; Gal-Or, 1985; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 
1998). According to Benzoni (2007, p. 23), this concept “predicts that a firm which is 
first to enter a new market (early entrant) will accumulate so many advantages that 
later entrants will have difficulties to compete on equal terms”. Benzoni (2007) goes 
further in presenting a sequential entry model in the mobile network market where the 
level of profits for the later entrants depends on the timing of their entry in the market. 
He also confirms “the existence of later entrants’ inherent disadvantages in a fixed-cost 
industry with fast growing demand. The later a firm enters such a market, the higher its 
initial investment must be” (Benzoni, 2007, pp. 27-28). This may explain the presence 
of one ‘historic’ domestic football broadcaster both in France and the UK (respectively 
Canal Plus and Sky). Indeed, it might be too difficult for later entrants to find the 
funding required to compete with the first mover. Benzoni (2007, p. 28) provides 
additional elements to explain this situation: “As the later entrant cannot spread its 
investments over several years, it must immediately offer the same quality of service as 
an early entrant, and will consequently face a financial abyss at entry, leaving it with no 
room to manoeuvre to develop its commercial strategy”. Benzoni (2007) talks about the 
“curse of later entrants” to characterise such a situation. 
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Another relevant concept developed by Benzoni (2007) is the war of attrition. This war 
can take the form of a loss leader strategy on the short term with profits expected on the 
long term after having discouraged other competitors. Defined by Andreff (2012, p.51): 
“This strategy is expensive, because it generates negative profits (losses) […]. The stake 
of the attrition war is to incite the competitor to give up, but the outcome is uncertain”. 
This “theory of predation” completes the “first mover advantages” and, like the latter, 
can explain that ‘historic’ broadcasters retain the rights and their competitors leave the 
market. 
 
Over-valued markets in sport? 
The notion of sports bubble is often associated with the purchase of sports broadcasting 
rights, transfer fees for players, salaries for superstars or the pursuit of relocation (or 
expansion) by franchises. North American sports leagues offer an example of the 
situation where a franchise is in a monopoly position when dealing with potential 
municipalities in an oligopolistic situation to host a team (Andreff, 2014). Hosting a 
sports franchise is a factor of prestige for municipalities and franchises use their power 
of attraction to generate an intense competition between municipalities which can result 
in overbidding. Noll and Zimbalist (2011) point that new facilities (relocation or 
expansion often requires building them) do not provide substantial economic 
development. Andreff (2014, p.14) explains that ‘’ hosting a franchise can create only a 
negligible positive economic impact, when not negative’’. Coates and Humphreys 
(2006, p.298) suggest that ‘’net benefits of stadiums and arenas may be highly localized 
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in areas near these facilities’’. This is in line with results establishing that properties 
gain value when they are close to the facilities (Coates & Humphreys, 2002; Tu, 2005). 
If the relocation of a team alone cannot provide a substantial economic effect (Baade & 
Dye, 1988; Humphreys, 1999; Fort, 2006), being part of a broader strategy affecting a 
specific area of the city can help participate in an economic redevelopment (Siegfried & 
Zimbalist, 2000) 
 
Despite this, there is little evidence of the “tulip bulb” phenomenon reaching sport. The 
recent examples of the expansion of the NHL with Las Vegas Golden Knights (price of 
$500m in 2016) or the future expansion of the MLS (with the franchise team owned by 
David Beckham in Miami for a price estimated at $25m) illustrate the power of 
attraction enjoyed by professional sports even if it can be irrational at an economic level 
for some stakeholders (with the rise in taxes due to new facilities built with public 
subsidies). If there would be currently a bubble, citizens or consumers would be those 
that support it rather than private investors that own sports franchises. Such a bubble is 
not evident given that sports franchise values in North America have constantly risen 
since the early 1980s (Humphreys & Mondello, 2008; Scelles et al., 2013). 
 
Structure of the market for sports broadcasting rights 
Before focusing on the types of bids and the winner’s curse in the market for 
sports broadcasting rights, the main characteristics of this market need to be provided. 
Bolotny and Bourg (2006) describe a double market with upstream the primary market 
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(sports programmes) involving broadcasters (supply) and viewers (demand) and 
downstream the secondary market (broadcasting rights) involving broadcasters (demand 
now) and sports organizers (supply) (Figure 1). The secondary market is defined by 
various forms depending on the characteristics of supply and demand. Bourg and 
Gouguet (2007) classify them as in Table 3. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Table 3 
 
For the allocation of football broadcasting rights, Andreff (2014, p.15), 
following Solberg (2006), specifies that the most common procedures are English 
auction and sealed-first bid, or combinations of them. Sealed-first bid is the method of 
allocation used for the broadcasting rights in L1 for example. This league relies on the 
new modalities of sequential bids used by some professional sports leagues which put 
up for auction several packages. Sequential bids are different from simultaneous bids 
since after each package won by a bidder, every competitor is informed about who won 
and the amount paid. However, during the bidding process, the auction is blind like in 
the UK. 
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Famous examples of winner’s curse already appeared in European football. Andreff 
(2012) quotes the examples of Kirch Media in Germany4, Digital ITV which 
broadcasted the English football Championship and Alpha Digital Synthesis which 
broadcasted the Greek championship, all going bankrupt in 2002. The same happened to 
Telepiu and Stream in Italia. These bankruptcies caused major problems where they 
happened (Solberg & Haugen, 2010). The main consequences are financial for the 
clubs. Indeed, the failure of a broadcaster threatens clubs’ revenues. 30 English clubs 
were in trouble in 2002 when Digital ITV began to struggle before another channel 
(Sky) made a deal to recover the rights5. The bankruptcy of Kirch Media is a bit 
different, because of the emergency fund guaranteed by the German government6. In 
addition to the clubs, consumers are also affected by bankruptcies. Indeed, the product 
 
4 Kirchmedia went bankrupt with 2, 1 billion euros of debt after acquiring rights for football 
World cup of 2002 in South Korea & and of 2006 in Germany. L’Obs (2002) Médias : la 
faillite pour le géant Kirch, Available at 
http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/economie/20020408.OBS4648/medias-la-faillite-pour-le-geant-
kirch.html 
5 Born, Matt, 2002, Sky throws £95m lifeline to football clubs, Telegraph.  Available at 
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1400516/Sky-throws-95m-lifeline-to-football-
clubs.html 
6 Gibson, Owen, 2002, Germany to rescue clubs if Kirch folds, The Guardian, 
Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2002/apr/04/broadcasting.citynews 
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they buy can be depreciated with the risk of insolvency for some teams (Scelles, 
Szymanski & Dermit-Richard, 2017; Szymanski, 2017) and the potential departures of 
star players during the season. 
 
Indices of a winner’s curse in the market for sports broadcasting rights 
Beyond the illustrations above, it is necessary to identify some indices of a winner’s 
curse in the market for sports broadcasting rights to answer the aim of this paper. 
Andreff (2014, p.7) claims that “A major difficulty with the winner’s curse concept 
consists in testing its very existence”. Regarding the market for sports broadcasting 
rights, Andreff (2014, p.18) identifies six indices, some of them being supported by 
other authors: 
1) A very swift increase in TV rights fees on a same sporting event from one 
broadcasting contract to the next one. 
2) Financial loss endured by a TV company on a broadcast deal: income derived from 
televising a sporting event do not cover sunk costs of producing the broadcast, including 
those rights paid after outbidding competing TV. This is supported by Solberg and 
Hammervold (2008) who highlight that quite a number of sports rights deals have ended 
up being unprofitable for the TV network. 
3) A post-bid bankruptcy which exhibits ex post that a TV channel could not afford the 
bid which it won due to overoptimistic valuation. This is supported by Buraimo (2006) 
who refers to ITV Digital as a case where the winning TV channel is so much cursed 
that it goes bankrupt. 
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4) Too many unknown and uncertain details about the date, the place and the 
participants (qualified teams and athletes) of a sporting event which falls adrift into 
unexpectedly low broadcast revenues and excessive costs ending up in a loss. These 
unknown and uncertain details lead the most optimistic highest bidder to win and be 
cursed (Fort, 2003). As underlined by Gratton and Solberg (2007), the winner’s problem 
is that he realises this too late. 
5) Outbidding newcomers which enter the broadcast market for a given sporting event 
increase aggressive competition on the demand side and thus make the winner’s curse 
more likely to happen. This is supported by Scelles and Dermit-Richard (2016) who 
find a positive correlation between competition and the amount of TV rights. 
6) TV rights re-packaging, in reducing the number of products on sale in the face of a 
given number of TV channels leads to increased competition that triggers TV rights fees 
inflation and thus a greater likelihood of the winner’s curse. This might be questioned. 
Supposing both fewer packages and the same number of bidders might be not realistic 
because some TV channels might be discouraged to bid due to their insufficient 
financial resources. As such, it might be the case that re-packaging does not trigger TV 
rights fees inflation due to fewer TV channels interested and does not lead to a greater 
probability of the winner’s curse. 
More generally, the six indices identified by Andreff (2014) need to be verified with 
empirical data. They may also need to be organised in a more logical manner as one 
would expect that bankruptcy will be the consequence of the other indices and, as such, 
appears after them in the list. Besides, a seventh index not listed by Andreff (2014) is 
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relative to disappointment, which is a central element in the definition of the winner’s 
curse. Disappointment may be the consequence of costs higher than expected ex post 
(Gratton & Solberg, 2007) or insufficient returns, due for example to fluctuations in the 
supply side for advertising (Blair, 2012). 
 
3. Aim and methodology 
The main aim of this article is to verify the existence of a winner’s curse in the domestic 
markets for broadcasting rights of the French and English football leagues. The 
underlying objective is to assess whether some indices of this situation are confirmed 
and can cause a winner’s curse. 
We rely on the six indices identified by Andreff (2014) and disappointment: 
a) The very swift increase in TV rights fees (I1) is investigated by comparing the 
evolution and the annual increase in domestic TV rights. 
b) For outbidding newcomers (I2), domestic broadcasters are listed for both countries 
since the early 1980s with an analysis of the consequence of their entry in the market. 
c) For TV rights repackaging (I3), we examine the evolution of the national TV rights in 
relation to the number of packages since the 1980s. 
d) For unknown and uncertain details (I4), the evolution of expenditure related to both 
domestic leagues is analysed together with the level of profits for historic broadcasters 
Sky and Canal Plus. Moreover, player moves between those two leagues are taken into 
consideration. 
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e) Financial losses (I5) are investigated for broadcasters of the English and French 
football leagues other than Sky and Canal Plus. 
f) For post-bid bankruptcy (I6), we focus on the case of the EPL broadcaster Setanta. 
g) For winner’s disappointment related to the underestimation of the costs and/or 
overestimation of the return (ex post real value lower than expected) (I7), we look at 
media interviews of representatives having purchased broadcasting rights in France and 
the UK. 
We have reorganised the order provided by Andreff (2014) based on the following 
assumptions: on the expenditure side, I1 (increase in TV rights) might be explained by 
I2 (outbidding newcomers) that might be explained by I3 (TV rights repackaging); on 
the financial side, I4 (unknown and uncertain details) might explain I5 (financial losses) 
that might explain I6 (bankruptcy) and/or I7 (disappointment). When dealing with I2, 
we first attempt to verify that outbidding newcomers increase aggressive competition 
before observing whether this makes the winner’s curse more likely to happen; when 
dealing with I4, we focus only on the existence of unknown and uncertain details and 
not on their financial consequences since the latter are redundant with I5 (financial 
losses).  
Eventually, the methodology consists in verifying: 
(1) the seven indices for the French and English football leagues in their respective 
domestic markets over the period 1980-2020; 
(2) that they led to a winner’s curse; and  
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(3) whether the winners cursed are the main winner (main package), a secondary 
winner (secondary package) or both (‘game of chicken’).  
Multiple sources are used for the data collection: public reports Ofcom 
Summary of UK sports rights and Sky annual report (2015, 2016) for the UK case; 
DNCG7, CSA (2001), Senat (1996) and Eveno (2006) for the French case; and 
Transfermarkt for player transfers. When another source is used, it is explicitly 
mentioned.  
 
4. Results 
Very swift increase in TV rights? 
We analyse the increase rate from one contract to the next one for the EPL and L1 TV 
rights respectively in the UK and in France. The problem is to determine what a very 
swift increase is: +50%? +100 %? Figure 2 shows the evolution of TV rights fees (in 
euros) to provide an idea about the amounts at stake.  
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 deals more specifically with the annual increase rates (based on pounds 
instead of euros for the EPL).  
Figure 3 
 
7 DNCG report from 2003 to 2016, http://www.lfp.fr/corporate/dncg 
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It is worth noting that almost all contracts have been negotiated for several years 
with a single annual fee over the contract length in the UK while this has been the case 
in France since 2005-2006, explaining the presence of annual increase rates equal to 
0%8. 
Figure 3 is largely supportive of the hypothesis of a very swift increase in TV 
rights, both for the EPL and the L1 (I1 confirmed). In England, out of 12 variations, 9 
increase rates are above 50% (75%), among which 5 are above 100% (42%). In France, 
out of 22 variations, 8 increase rates are above 50% (36%), among which 5 are above 
100% (23%) as for England. Given that more variations (France compared to England) 
reduce the likelihood of reaching an increase rate of at least 50% for each of them (i.e. it 
is easier to reach 75% of its increase rates above 50% when there are mainly three to 
five years between each contract as for England rather than 16 annual variations as for 
France), we can consider that England and France present a quite similar pattern. 
Nevertheless, France has not enjoyed an increase rate above 20% since 2005-2006 (TV 
rights are negotiated for three to four years since then) whereas three of the last four 
variation rates have been above 50% for England. 
Outbidding newcomers? 
 
8 In France, Figure 3 shows annual increase rates equal to 0% from 1988-1989 to 1991-1992. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that this is based on estimated rather than actual amounts.  
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In the UK, BBC and ITV cooperated to share coverage rather than compete against each 
other until 1988, when ITV pushed up the annual fee to £11m in 1988-1992 for its 
exclusive coverage (Gratton & Solberg, 2007). Sky enjoyed then an exclusive coverage 
for 15 years and even a monopoly after securing the 2001-2004 deal, leading to a 
decrease in the price it paid for the 2004-2007 rights. During the life of the latter, the 
European Commission insisted that at least one of the packages offered for the 2007-
2010 period went to a different broadcaster. Setanta, an Irish channel, invested in the 
Premier League but failed to attract enough subscribers to be viable and was unable to 
pay what they signed for in 2009. Then, ESPN UK acquired the rights that Setanta gave 
up (for 2009-2010 but also 2010-2013) before BT entered the market and has become a 
serious rival for Sky since then (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 
 
In France, Canal+ initially enjoyed a monopoly for the Ligue 1. Its first serious rival 
was TPS in 1999 which stopped its exclusive coverage. However, Canal+ recovered its 
exclusivity for the 2005-2008 period. Then, TPS struggled until Canal+ absorbed its 
competitor. For the 2008-2012 period, Orange obtained three packages before giving up 
  
 
 
20 
 
 
at the end of the contract due to a different strategy adopted by its new CEO9. To avoid 
that Canal+ became again the only broadcaster, the president of the LFP Frédéric 
Thiriez launched in 2011 CFoot, a channel belonging to the league and broadcasting the 
Ligue 2. The channel stopped less than one year later with only 300,000 subscribers and 
€15m losses10.  
The last major competitor for Canal+ is BeIN Sports (formerly Al Jazeera Sport) (Table 
5). They obtained some packages both for the 2012-2016 and 2016-2020 contracts. 
Natixis11 estimated that their cumulated operating deficit will reach €2.2bn for the 2012-
2020 period. Their cumulated losses were already €1bn by the end of 201512. 
Eventually, both for the EPL and the L1, outbidding newcomers regularly appeared and 
increased competition (I2 confirmed). 
 
 
9 Ozap (2010). Officiel : Orange ne diffusera plus la Ligue 1 après 2012 [Official: Orange will 
not broadcast anymore the Ligue 1 after 2012]. Available at 
http://www.ozap.com/actu/orange-diffusera-ligue-2012-droits-canal/362544 
10 La Tribune (2012). CFoot victime collatérale d'Al Jazeera [CFoot Al Jazeera's collateral 
victim] Available at http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/sport/football/cfoot-victime-
collaterale-d-al-jazeera_1077829.html 
11 Ecofoot (2015). Beinsport condamné à être déficitaire ? [Beinsport condamné à être 
déficitaire ?] Available at 
http://www.latribune.fr/actualites/economie/france/20150126trib7b3b3ae64/bein-sports-
condamne-a-etre-deficitaire.html 
12  Nokovitch, S. (2016, 14 December). Le milliard qui fait peur [Le milliard qui fait peur]. 
L’Equipe. 
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Table 5 
 
 
TV rights re-packaging for a given sporting event 
In the UK, TV sports rights packaging had been impacted by several 
interventions from the competition authority. The trend is to have more and more 
premium live packages to enhance competition and allow more broadcasters to be part 
of the market. Nowadays, there are seven “premium” packages in the Premier League 
(only one from 1992 to 2001 and two from 2001 to 200713), and one broadcaster cannot 
have more than five live packages. Figure 4 suggests a positive correlation between TV 
rights and number of packages which is confirmed by the calculation of the Spearman 
correlation coefficient between them (0.88, significant at the 1% level; Spearman 
correlation due to data being not normal according to the Shapiro-Wilk test both for the 
number of packages and the amount of TV rights). 
Figure 4 
 
In France, from 1999 to 2005, four packages were offered as for the 2005-2008 
period, when Canal+ was again in a monopoly situation on the market14. Over the 2008-
 
13 Ofcom (2007). Summary of UK Sports rights. 
14 Le Monde (2008). Canal+ et Orange se répartissent les droits télévisuels de la Ligue 1 de 
football. [Canal+ and Orange divide up the television rights of the Ligue 1] Available 
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2012 period, 12 packages were allocated before being reduced to 11 over the 2012-2016 
period then six over the 2016-2020 period15. As for English football, Figure 5 suggests a 
positive correlation between TV rights and the number of packages in French football 
which is confirmed by the calculation of the Spearman correlation coefficient between 
them (0.87, significant at the 1% level; Spearman correlation due to data being not 
normal according to the Shapiro-Wilk test both for the number of packages and the 
amount of TV rights).  
Figure 5 
 
Eventually, there is no evidence of a link between repackaging and a potential 
winner’s curse (I3 not confirmed). Correlation coefficients between TV rights and 
number of packages are rather supportive of more packages leading to increased TV 
rights both in the UK and France even if the limited number of observations means that 
some caution is required before drawing conclusions. The broader broadcasting market 
context can be viewed as a variable that impacts the influence of the number of 
 
at http://www.lemonde.fr/sport/article/2008/02/07/canal-et-orange-se-partagent-les-droits-
televisuels-du-football_1008332_3242.html 
15 Mediasportif (2015) Droits TV -5 diffuseurs se sont positionnés sur les droits de la ligue 1 et 
de ligue 2 [TV rights -5 diffusers positioned on the rights of the ligue 1 and the ligue 2] 
Available at http://www.mediasportif.fr/2014/04/02/droits-tv-5-diffuseurs-se-sont-
positionnes-sur-les-droits-la-ligue1-et-ligue2/ 
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packages on TV rights. Moreover, there may be other extraneous variables explaining 
the strong correlation coefficients above. 
 
Unknown and uncertain details? 
Regarding the EPL and L1, unknown and uncertain details are about teams and 
players. They may impact the quality of live games if they relate to the best teams and 
players. It is scarce that the best teams are relegated at a lower level. This was the case 
for Marseille in France in 1994-1995 and 1995-1996. Canal Plus profits were lower 
during these two seasons than in 1993-1994 and 1996-1997 (Figure 6). Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to establish a relationship between the two events (absence of Marseille and 
decrease in profits for Canal Plus). To deal with uncertainty about players taking part in 
the league, a perspective not discussed yet seems fruitful: the indirect competition 
between Sky and Canal Plus. The idea is that the TV rights offered by the two channels 
are a main source of income for clubs that is mainly spent in players. As such, a larger 
amount spent by one channel compared to the other provides a greater likelihood that 
clubs playing in the league associated to the former attracts better players, including 
those from the league associated to the latter. This is even more likely since the Bosman 
case of 1995 reducing the constraints on the number of players from the European 
Union per club. 
 
Figure 6 
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Figure 1 shows that, most of the time, the domestic TV rights have been higher 
for the EPL than L1. The potential impact on spending for players has been amplified 
by TV rights shared with Ligue 2 clubs in France, international TV rights far higher for 
the EPL than L1 and English clubs generating more revenues from other sources than 
French clubs (Scelles & Dermit-Richard, 2016), meaning more overall revenues in EPL 
than in L1 (Figure 7). Even when Canal Plus spent €600m per year over the 2005-2008 
period, French clubs were not able to attract or even retain their best players, e.g. Lyon 
losing Essien (Chelsea) in 2005, Diarra (Real Madrid) in 2006, and Abidal (FC 
Barcelona), Malouda (Chelsea) and Tiago (Juventus FC) in 2007. This has become even 
harder for French clubs since 2007 with the continual growth of the EPL TV rights, 
relying in particular on Sky’s expenditure. Some of the best players having operated in 
L1 since then moved to the EPL16. Over the most recent period, Table 6 and 7 confirm 
that the EPL attracts the best players from L1 while the contrary is not true17. These 
 
16 E.g. Nasri from Marseille to Arsenal in 2008; Chamakh from Bordeaux and Koscielny from 
Lorient both to Arsenal in 2010; Gervinho and Cabaye from Lille to Arsenal and 
Newcastle respectively in 2011; Hazard from Lille to Chelsea, Giroud from Montpellier to 
Arsenal and Lloris from Lyon to Tottenham in 2012; André Ayew and Payet from 
Marseille to Swansea and West Ham respectively, Martial from Monaco to Manchester 
United and Kanté from Caen to Leicester in 2015; and Ibrahimović and David Luiz from 
Paris to Manchester United and Chelsea respectively in 2016. Star moves from the EPL to 
L1 are much scarce and exclusively to Paris since the Qatari era (begun in 2011-2012), 
with David Luiz from Chelsea in 2014 (back there in 2016) and Di Maria from 
Manchester United in 2015. 
17 See Appendix 1 for details about the players involved. 
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elements illustrate the uncertainty about players taking part in the competition, while 
stars have been identified as a key determinant of TV audience in the EPL (Buraimo & 
Simmons, 2015; Scelles, 2017). Nevertheless, financial data for Canal Plus (Figure 6) is 
not supportive of this uncertainty leading to unexpectedly low broadcast revenues and 
high costs ending up in a loss (I4 not confirmed). An explanation may be that despite 
the best players leaving the French Ligue 1, its level remains at a sufficiently good 
standard and/or TV viewers have a sufficiently strong identification to French clubs. 
Another explanation may be a sufficiently high number of known and certain details 
about the dates, the places and the participants due to a relative inertia from one period 
to another. 
 
Figure 7 
Table 6 
Table 7 
 
Financial loss endured? 
According to the elements developed in the previous subsection, Sky might have 
developed a financial advantage due to the EPL attracting the best French players 
(among others). However, Sky might have spent too much to attract the best players 
(and has not fully achieved this since Messi, Ronaldo, Neymar and even the British 
Bale do not play in the EPL) compared to the real increase in TV audiences and thus 
subscription fees they generate. As such, it might be the case that Sky has endured some 
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financial losses, consistent with the winner’s curse. Figure 8 shows the evolution of 
Sky’s expenditure for the EPL TV rights and its profit.  
 
Figure 8 
 
Some caution should be taken when discussing the relationship between both 
indicators since Sky does not rely on EPL broadcasting only18. Yet, this is a (the?) key 
element in Sky’s strategy from its beginning (Douglas, 1999)19. Sky seems to have 
suffered from the winner’s curse over the 1998-2002 period, i.e. most of the 1997-2001 
contract length and the first season of the 2001-2004 contract. Nevertheless, it then 
recovered and benefited from having ‘destroyed’ competition with the 2001-2004 
contract when securing the 2004-2007 contract. Indeed, due to the absence of 
competitors, it could spend less money in TV rights. A short-term strategy of losses 
could be a long-term strategy for profits or a “loss-leader strategy with the investments 
 
18 Moreover, we must be cautious about the timing of the amortisation of the TV rights: “The 
amortisation of an intangible asset begins when the asset is available for use, and is 
charged to the income statement through operating expense over the asset’s useful 
economic life in order to match the expected pattern of consumption of future economic 
benefits embodied in the asset” (Sky plc annual report, 2015, p.89). TV rights are 
amortised when they are made available to clubs (e.g. TV rights for 2016-2017 amortised 
in 2016-2017 and not before as they begin to be available in July and not before). 
19 Douglas, T. (1999, 12 March). Murdoch’s rise to the top. BBC. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1999/03/99/murdochs_big_match/167937.stm 
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planned to be profitable in the long run—for example, by forcing rivals out of the 
market” (Hammervold & Solberg, 2006, p.148). This is consistent with the elements 
developed in the theoretical framework about the war of attrition. Sky suffered again 
in 2007-2008 after having faced the competition from Setanta for the 2007-2010 
contracts. Since then, Sky has always made a profit, despite the competition from BT 
since the 2013-2016 deal. The evolution of Sky’s profit does not support the hypothesis 
of a winner’s curse for the company.  
Figure 6 shows the evolution of Canal Plus expenditure for the L1 TV rights and 
its profit. As for Sky, some caution should be taken when discussing the relationship 
between both indicators since Canal Plus does not rely on L1 broadcasting only. It 
seems that the swift increase in TV rights provided by Canal Plus in 1999-2000 has 
durably reduced its profit. Nevertheless, the company has always made a profit since 
then. As such, the hypothesis of a winner’s curse for Canal Plus is not supported, 
consistent with the case of Sky but contrary to the idea that the indirect competition 
between the two broadcasters might have generated financial losses for Canal Plus. It is 
likely that Canal Plus could make an extra profit until 1998-1999 due to the absence of 
competition, which is characteristic of a ‘winner’s blessing’ instead. The 2005-2008 
contracts could have led to a winner’s curse for Canal Plus. Nevertheless, it allowed the 
channel to ‘destroy’ competition (Canal Plus eventually absorbed its competitor TPS) 
without damaging its profit and to reduce its offer for the following deals. 
Both the cases of Sky and Canal Plus are not supportive of the winner’s curse. 
Even without having access to their annual profits, their long presence in the market 
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might have been interpreted as the absence of persistent losses, assuming in this case 
that they would have left the market. As described by Harrison and List (2008, p.823), 
“It is plausible to assume that survival in the industry as a leader provides sufficient 
evidence that they do not make persistent losses in their natural market setting”. Sky 
and Canal Plus have enjoyed a long-term overall profitability of their networks from 
market domination, this profitability supporting the increasing transfer fees paid for 
players and the rising cost of acquisition of sport assets (broadcast networks and clubs 
themselves) over time (Scelles et al., 2016). They relate to the long-term returns from 
securing the long-term benefits of extended contracts. However, the fact that Sky and 
Canal Plus did not suffer from the winner’s curse does not mean that there was not a 
curse for the winner of specific packages, as exemplified by the cases mentioned in the 
subsection ‘Outbidding newcomers?’ that are summarised in Table 8. These examples 
confirmed the existence of financial losses for some broadcasters (I5 confirmed). 
 
Table 8 
 
Post-bid bankruptcy? 
Over the 2007-2010 period, the Irish television station Setanta secured two EPL 
packages consisting of 46 live games per year at a total cost of £392m, or £131m per 
year (Gratton et al., 2012). Industry experts believed that Setanta UK needed 1.9 million 
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customers to break even (BBC, 2009)20. The problem was that they had only 1.2 million 
customers21 and it was reported that they lost around £100m per year22. This led Setanta 
UK into administration at the end of the 2008-2009 season, after they lost one package 
of their former bid. Setanta surprised observers when they outbid Sky for 23 matches in 
2006 but it was a step too high for them as Mike Darcy23, Sky’s chief operating officer, 
mentioned: “Setanta ran into difficulties because it tried to grow too fast and lost 
control of costs”. As one former Setanta executive stated, they maybe exited the market 
too quickly, underlining the fact that Murdoch empire was in the early 1990s “on the 
brink of bankruptcy, largely because of the money it had lavished on Sky”24. In France, 
no TV channel went into administration but TPS was absorbed by Canal Plus after 
having lost its packages for the 2005-2008 contract. The example of Setanta illustrates 
the possibility of a post-bid bankruptcy (I6 confirmed). 
Economic experiments on the winner’s curse may explain the case of Setanta. 
Indeed, Kagel and Levin (2001, p.11) find that new entrants make what we can call 
‘rookie mistakes’: “Auctions with inexperienced bidders show a pervasive winner’s 
 
20 BBC (2009, June 23). Setanta goes into administration. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8115360.stm 
21 BBC (2009). Setanta loses Premier League TV rights. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8109954.stm 
22 ibid 
23 The Guardian (2009). Setanta thought it had a sporting chance. It lost. Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/jun/28/sentant-bskyb-football 
24 Ibid. 
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curse that results in numerous bankruptcies”. In addition, the winner’s curse for 
inexperienced bidders has been proven to be particularly “robust” in laboratory 
experiments (Harrison & List, 2008). 
 
Disappointment?  
Winner’s disappointment is an indication of a winner’s curse according to Thaler (1988) 
and Andreff (2012). Leaving the market can be interpreted as disappointment, even 
more if it is associated with losses. This situation happened frequently in the market for 
broadcasting rights in English and French football where the two historic broadcasters 
remain in place while other broadcasters follow one another, mostly for secondary 
packages. Nonetheless, exiting the market is not enough of a prove to consider that a 
broadcaster is disappointed. Comments made by executives and spokespersons of 
broadcast companies can reveal such a disappointment. Therefore, we looked at the 
comments made by executives and spokespersons of broadcasters that left the market, 
especially those associated with losses. 
For example, Stéphane Richard, CEO of France Telecom (Orange), said in 2010: 
“Considering our experience, if I had to make the decision tomorrow to renew the rights 
for football for 203 million euros a year, I would not make it. 25” This informs about the 
 
25 Challenges (2010) INTERVIEW DE... - "France Télécom doit se remobiliser". Available at 
https://www.challenges.fr/entreprise/interview-de-france-telecom-doit-se-
remobiliser_359170 
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disappointment felt by Orange after having acquired the rights in 2008. Orange owned 
one of the three premium packages (Saturday 9pm prime time, 38 games plus V.O.D26 
highlights of every game). S. Richard recently added that: “The problem with the 
development of a proprietary offering in sport it that, every four years, you can lose 
most of the programs that make your attractiveness or you can see the price double. The 
business of sports rights is too volatile and speculative for us” 27. 
Following the bankruptcy of Setanta’s UK division, a spokesperson for ITN (producer) 
said: “We are extremely disappointed by the news that Setanta has today gone into 
administration and will cease trading”28. Such comments in both countries confirm the 
disappointment felt by some broadcasters (I7 confirmed). 
 
5. Discussion 
Our results support four indices provided by Andreff (2014) and I7 (disappointment), 
but not I3 (TV rights repackaging leading to increased competition) and I4 (unknown 
 
26 Video on demand. 
27 Les Echos (2017) Stéphane Richard : « Les télécoms doivent devenir multiservices ». 
Available at: https://www.lesechos.fr/28/09/2017/lesechos.fr/030634281924_stephane-
richard----les-telecoms-doivent-devenir-multiservices-.htm# 
28 The Guardian (2009) Setanta goes off air with loss of more than 200 jobs, Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/jun/23/setanta-goes-into-administration 
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and uncertain details leading to revenues lower than expected and financial losses) (step 
1 in our methodology partially verified). They led to ‘a’ winner’s curse (step 2 verified) 
but not to ‘the’ winner’s curse. Indeed, broadcasters that have been cursed are not Sky 
and Canal Plus which always win the best packages but rather those broadcasters which 
won secondary packages (answer to step 3). The economic theory can help explain 
these results. 
 
Horizontal and vertical integration 
Some economic phenomena can be considered as the consequences or at least be 
related to a sort of blessing or curse such as first mover advantages, the curse of later 
entrants and war of attrition described in the theoretical framework. Some others not 
developed in the latter can also be highlighted. For example, horizontal and vertical 
integration did happen in the industry.  In France, some illustrations are the absorption 
of TPS by Canal Plus (horizontal integration) and the latter being shareholder of Paris 
Saint-Germain from 1991 to 2006 (vertical integration). It might be argued that the 
latter is an illustration of an advantage the first mover may have. Indeed, Canal Plus was 
able to invest in Paris Saint-Germain thanks to its very good start from the end of 1984 
(when the TV channel was born) to 1991. This is characterised by the following 
economic data: turnover from €82.6m in 1985 to €938.6m in 1991 and profit from -
€50.3m in 1985 to €164.8m in 1991 (Quélin, 2000). This may be explained by the 
exclusivity for broadcasting French football. Investing in Paris Saint-Germain was 
supposed to enable Canal Plus to build a strong competitor for Olympique de Marseille, 
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of which the increasing domination threatened the interest of the championship 
(decreasing outcome uncertainty); to increase the attractiveness of Paris Saint-Germain 
which represents a strong market (Paris); and to reduce unknown and uncertain details 
in controlling Paris Saint-Germain, decreasing the impact of a clue identified as 
inducing the winner’s curse by Andreff (2014). A similar situation can be identified 
today with the relationship between BeIN Sports and Paris Saint-Germain. In the UK, 
Sky attempted a similar vertical integration over Manchester United in 1999 but this 
was blocked by the UK Government on the recommendation of the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (Gerrard, 2000).  
Coming back to horizontal integration, about it is worth noting the recent failed 
agreement of distribution between Canal Plus and BeIN Sports after the decision of the 
French antitrust authority not to allow it. Cases of horizontal integration are not specific 
to French football in Europe. In Italy, Telepiu (loss of around 1.645 billion euros) and 
Stream (loss of around 595 million euros) merged into Sky Italia in 2003 (Solberg, 
2006). In Spain, three competitors merged into Sogecable, known as PRISA TV today.  
 
Impact on consumer welfare 
A consequence of the race for the rights is the impact on consumer welfare. History has 
shown that competition authorities made many interventions on this market to prevent 
monopoly situations or at least limit them. However, broadcasters are not the only 
actors to be cursed. Indeed, Seamus Coffey (then Butler, 2015) explained in 2009 the 
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situation of Sky and Setanta as “two monopolies are worse than one” when describing 
the annual cost to watch every single game for the consumer, based on monthly and 
fixed costs: 
(2009) Sky without competitor: 12 x €30 + €80 = €440. 
           Sky and Setanta: 12 x €30 + 12 x €18 = €576. 
(2014) Sky and BT Sports: 600€. 
It is paradoxical to see that competition leads to a raise of the cost for the 
consumer in this market where two channels cannot broadcast the same game. In the 
UK, a rule prevents a broadcaster to retain more than five out of seven packages for 
broadcasting rights. This may be the reason why there are currently two monopolies in 
the market (Sky and BT Sport). Nevertheless, the consumer may not be cursed if he 
only subscribes to the broadcasters that won the ‘premium’ packages, a sensible 
hypothesis given that fans prefer to watch the best teams (Buraimo & Simmons, 2015; 
Scelles, 2017). In a situation with two main broadcasters, the consumer may be blessed 
if he chooses to watch the best teams and cursed if he wants to watch every single game 
broadcast. This might be a direction for further research.  
It might also be the case that with two broadcasters, the owner of the premium 
packages may be able to reduce the cost of subscription for consumers as it pays less 
money for the rights than in a situation of exclusivity. As such, it may attract more 
subscribers and be able to make profits. On the contrary, the owner of the other 
packages may not be able to sell enough subscriptions to be profitable. This would fit 
with our results showing that the second mover is the one who is cursed. 
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Overview on the market for broadcasting rights 
The development of football TV rights is supported by two groups of stakeholders who 
are at risk to suffer from its development: 
• Broadcasters if it occurs that they paid too much, whether the price of 
subscription they set is too cheap and / or the number of subscribers is lower 
than expected.  
Broadcasters should anticipate in the bidding process how not to go beyond a 
cap where the bid exceeds ex ante the earnings ex post (Les Echos, 201629). 
• Customers who, in many cases, face a situation of monopoly, whether there are 
only one or two monopolies. It might be the case that the consumer is cursed as 
soon as he subscribes to pay-TV. This is called “siphoning” and describes a 
situation where “pay-TV will carry events that were formerly available on free 
television, so that viewers pay for infra-marginal viewing of games that would 
have been broadcast anyway for free” (Noll, 2007, p.409). For Sean Williams 
 
29 Lévêque, Francois, “Les surenchères des droits du foot, plus d'argent pour les joueurs, moins 
pour les téléspectateurs” [The higher bids of the football broadcasting rights more money 
for the players, less for the televiewers], Les Echos, http://www.lesechos.fr/idees-
debats/cercle/cercle-156798-les-surencheres-des-droits-du-foot-plus-dargent-pour-les-
joueurs-moins-pour-les-telespectateurs-1220448.php, 05/09/16 
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(2009), managing director of strategy at BT Retail at the time of Setanta’s 
bankruptcy, there is a market failure in pay-TV in the UK and this “gives rise to 
significant harm to consumers in the form of higher prices, restricted choices 
and diminished innovation.”30 
      Interestingly, Sky and BT agreed a deal allowing their respective customers to 
get access to the other network’s channels in December 2017 (Sweney, 2017). This may 
be a way to avoid the winner’s and customers’ curse. 
It is also important to mention the ‘no-single buyer’ rule that prevents one 
channel to acquire all packages in the bidding process. A European Commission 
decision made in 2006 about the EPL aimed to enhance competition by establishing that 
a minimum of two broadcasters must own rights of live broadcasting31. The problem of 
this kind of decision is that broadcasters can adopt an illegal agreement behaviour as it 
happened in Italy between Sky Italia and Mediaset where the ‘no-single buyer’ rule is 
also in force. On one hand, this rule can help enhance competition between broadcasters 
and thus generate a growth in TV rights (e.g. Bundesliga TV rights over the 2018-2021 
period). On the other hand, this regulation can affect consumer welfare as “it penalises 
 
30 BBC (2009). Setanta goes into administration. Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8115360.stm 
31 European Commission (2006). Competition: Commission makes commitments from FA 
Premier League legally binding. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-
356_en.htm?locale=en 
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consumers in an almost comical way. It is essentially a remedy that requires football 
fans to subscribe to two different television services to have full access to the televised 
games of the championship” (Ibanez Colomo, 2016)32. This question the relevance of 
the ‘no-single buyer’ rule which is also doubtful for the broadcaster who wins the 
‘second’ package or a set of packages. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The winner’s curse is difficult to be clearly identified but a range of indices can enable 
to evidence its presence (Andreff, 2014). The historic broadcasters in the EPL and L1 
(respectively Sky and Canal Plus) have not suffered from the winner’s curse and they 
have probably even been blessed at some times, especially in monopoly situation. The 
second mover in the market for broadcasting rights has been identified as more exposed 
to the curse. These conclusions are consistent with the economic concepts of “first 
mover advantages” and “curse of later entrants”.  
Disappointment felt by the winner is a main indicator of a winner’s curse 
according to Thaler (1988) and Andreff (2012), and as such has been added to Andreff 
(2014)’s indices. Leaving the market can be interpreted as disappointment, even more if 
it is associated with losses. This situation happened frequently in the market for 
 
32 Chillingcompetition (2016). Football, TV rights and the ‘single buyer rule’: In a world of 
commitment decisions, bad policy dies hard. 
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broadcasting rights in English and French football. Nevertheless, losses on a specific 
market like that for football TV rights can also be part of a broader strategy. Football 
rights which are often associated with large TV audiences can constitute a ‘drawing 
card’ for broadcasters to attract a mass of subscribers and make profits on other 
products or with the overall price of the subscription that goes beyond football 
broadcasting. Costly investments in sports can be viewed as a necessity to promote 
other programmes that are more profitable. Recent losses in pay-TV subscribers33 can 
be related to the decrease in these additional programmes where companies make 
profits by using cross-marketing offerings. Further research may focus on the role of 
football broadcasting rights in the broader strategy of a TV channel. It may also 
investigate more in depth the evolution of the costs for TV viewers compared to that of 
their living standard. As for the second mover in the market for football broadcasting 
rights, they may be cursed. Beyond football, it may be worth investigating Olympic 
broadcasting rights, characterised by the rise of streaming activities by the main 
networks, to establish whether the indices tested in football are confirmed in another 
sports broadcasting market. 
  
 
33 Spangler, Todd (2017) Pay-TV Losses Could Accelerate to More Than 5 Million U.S. 
Households per Year, Survey Indicates, Variety, http://variety.com/2017/digital/news/pay-
tv-losses-cord-cutting-rbc-survey-1202565269/ 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Independent variables of the amount for broadcasting rights (Bolotny & Bourg, 2006, p. 113) 
 
    
 
Figure 2 Evolution of domestic TV rights for the English and French football league 
 
 
Figure 3 Annual increase rate of domestic TV rights for the English and French football 
leagues 
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Figure 4 Evolution of the national TV rights (in €m) and number of packages in English 
football 
 
 
Figure 5 Evolution of the national TV rights (in €m) and number of packages in French 
football
 
    
 
 
Figure 6 Evolution of expenditure for the French Ligue 1 TV rights and profit for Canal 
Plus (in €m) 
 
 
Figure 7 Total Revenue of EPL and Ligue 1 from 1996/97 to 2017/18 (in million euros) 
 
** Projected 
Source: Deloitte (2017, p.10) 
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Figure 8 Evolution of expenditure for the EPL TV rights and profit for Sky (in €m) 
 
 
 
 
Tables  
Table 1 Four types of bids and their modalities 
Type of bid Modality of the bid 
English Ascending 
Dutch Descending 
Sealed-first  The highest offer takes it and pays what he has offered 
Sealed-second  The highest offer takes it and pays the highest second offer     
 
Table 2 Illustrations of the objective and subjective approaches 
 Objective approach Subjective approach 
EV (estimated value) 120 120 
B (bid) 100 100 
RV (real value) 80 110 
Π e (expected profit) 20 (EV-B=120-100) 20 (EV-B=120-100) 
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Π f (final profit) -20 (RV-B=80-100) 10 (RV-B=110-100) 
B2 (2nd highest bid) Not relevant 90 
Surplus lost Not relevant Up to 10 (B-B2=100-
90) 
 
Table 3 Market, supply and demand in sports events broadcasting 
Market Events Supply Demand 
Monopoly Olympics Winter 2010 
Summer 2012 
 
IOC 
 
ABC, CBS, FOX, NBC, 
EPSN, TBS, CNN Sport, 
HBO, Direct TV, 
Newsport, Showtime 
 
Football World Cup 2006 
FIFA ABC, Cable TV, UER, 
Team AG, Kirch ISL, 
IMG-UFA, CWL 
Supply-side 
monopoly 
European Football 
Championship 2004 
UEFA UER, Kirch, Team AG, 
Octagon 
French football championship 
2006/2007 
League France Télévision, TF1, 
Canal Plus, TPS, M6 
Bilateral 
monopoly 
European Football 
Championship 1984 
UEFA UER 
Oligopsony  Baseball championship 1960 Professional 
teams 
ABC, CBS, NBC 
Monopsony French football championship 
1973/1974 
Professional 
teams 
ORTF 
 
 
Table 4 Domestic broadcasters of the English Premier League since 1983 
Period Channels 
1983-1988 BBC, ITV 
1988-1992 ITV 
1992-2007 Sky 
2007-2009 Sky, Setanta 
2009-2013 Sky, ESPN 
2013-2019 Sky, BT 
 
Table 5 Domestic broadcasters of the French Ligue 1 since 1984 
Period Channels 
    
 
1984-1999 Canal + 
1999-2005 Canal +, TPS 
2005-2008 Canal + 
2008-2012 Canal +, Orange, CFoot (2011-
2012) 
2012-2020 Canal +, BeIN Sports (formerly 
Al Jazeera Sports) 
 
Table 6 Player moves between the English Premier League and the French Ligue 1 in 
2014, 2015 and 2016 
L1 to EPL Name  Type of 
transactions 
Fees in £m (if 
transfer) 
 
 
 
 
2014 
Cabella 
Origi 
Amalfitano 
Stambouli 
Ospina 
Ecuele Manga 
Riviere 
Falcao 
Gomis 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
loan 
free 
9 
11.35 
0.9 
5.31 
3.60 
5.67 
5.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015 
Cabaye 
Gueye 
Amavi 
Ayew 
Veretout 
Kante 
Gradel 
Njie 
Djilobodji 
Payet 
Martial 
Thauvin 
Tabanou 
Sylla 
Falcao 
Toivonen 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
loan 
loan 
12.51 
8.10 
9.90 
10.80 
9 
8.10 
9 
12.69 
2.7 
13.50 
54 
16.52 
4.41 
               1.35 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 
Nkoudou 
Ndong 
Luiz 
Saiss 
Boufal 
Dja Djedje 
Mendy 
Batshuahy 
Mandanda 
Ibrahimovic 
Pied 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
free 
free 
free 
9.35 
18 
31.50 
3.4 
16.83 
3.24 
13.95 
35.10 
 
EPL to L1 Name  Type of 
transactions 
Fees in £m (if 
transfer) 
 
 
 
2014 
David Luiz 
Van Wolfswinkel 
Ba 
Stekelenburg 
Ilori 
Theophile Catherine 
Marveaux 
Origi 
transfer 
loan 
loan 
loan 
loan 
loan 
loan 
loan 
44.55 
 
 
 
 
2015 
Stambouli 
Rafael 
Di Maria 
Lopes 
Theophile Catherine 
Rekik 
Pasalic 
Fofana 
Cabella 
Boga 
Kemen 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
loan 
loan 
loan 
loan 
loan 
7.74 
2.88 
56.70 
10.80 
1.80 
4.50 
 
 
 
 
2016 
Eder 
Depay 
Payet 
Njie, 
Veretout 
Saivet 
Thauvin 
Gomis 
Balotelli 
transfer 
transfer 
transfer 
loan 
loan 
loan 
loan 
loan 
free 
4.05 
14.40 
26.37 
 
Source: Transfermarkt.co.uk 
    
 
Table 7 Player moves between the EPL and the L1 in 2014, 2015 and 2016  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Financial losses for broadcasters of the English and French football leagues 
other than Sky and Canal Plus 
England France 
Setanta, losses of 
£100m a year, 2007-
2009 
Orange, overall losses with their 
movie channel of €120m in 
201134 
CFoot, loss of €15m in 201235  
BeIN Sports, losses of €200m 
per year, 2012-201536 
 
 
 
 
34  Les Echos (2012). Orange continue à perdre de l’argent dans la télévision. Available at 
http://www.lesechos.fr/31/12/2012/LesEchos/21344-081-ECH_orange-continue-a-perdre-
de-l-argent-dans-la-television.htm 
35 L`Express (2012). CFoot victime collatérale d`Al Jazeera. Available at 
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/sport/football/cfoot-victime-collaterale-d-al-
jazeera_1077829.html 
36 Ecofoot (2015). Beinsport condamné à être déficitaire ? Available at 
http://www.latribune.fr/actualites/economie/france/20150126trib7b3b3ae64/bein-sports-
condamne-a-etre-deficitaire.html 
L1 to EPL 2014 2015 2016 Sum Total transfer fees 
Transfer 7 14 8 29 £336.47m 
Loan 1 2 3 6 
Free 1 0 0 1 
EPL to L1 2014 2015 2016 Sum Total transfer fees  
Transfer 1 6 3 10 £173.69m 
Loan 7 5 5 17 
Free 0 0 1 1 
